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In Part I of this paper we argued that New Labour is keen to use 
legislation to promote what it sees as desirable family forms and to 
discourage other, less favoured family practices.  The codification of 
this approach in the 1998 Green Paper Supporting Families – and in 
particular the ‘New Deal for Lone Parents’- was compared with recent 
empirical research on how people make decisions about their moral 
economies.  We concluded that the government’s approach is subject 
to a ‘rationality mistake’ – people do not make decisions in the way 
the government assumes and hence legislation can be inefficient or 
even oppressive.  Part II of the paper goes on to examine this 
contention further, this time focusing on chapter 4 of the Green Paper, 
indicatively entitled Strengthening Marriage.  Using recent empirical 
research on mothers’ views on marriage and cohabitation, we find 
further evidence of the ‘rationality mistake’ where the government 
has misunderstood the ways in which people make decisions about 
partnering, and hence misplaces the role of family law.  It concludes 
that supportive and flexible legislative frameworks are needed which 
recognise the varying ways in which people take moral economic 
decisions.
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Introduction
In Part I of this paper (Barlow and Duncan, date) we argued that New 
Labour is keen to use legislation to promote what it sees as desirable 
family forms and to discourage other, less favoured family practices. 
This results at least in part, from the government’s conservative and 
prescriptive version of communitarianism.  The codification of this 
approach in the government consultation document Supporting 
Families1 (‘the Green Paper’)– and in particular the ‘New Deal for 
Lone Parents’- was compared with recent empirical research on how 
people make decisions about their moral economies. We concluded 
that the government’s approach is subject to a ‘rationality mistake’ – 
people do not make decisions in the way the government assumes and 
hence legislation can be inefficient or even oppressive.  In this second 
part of the paper we go on to examine this contention further, this 
time focusing on chapter 4 of the Green Paper, indicatively entitled 
Strengthening Marriage.  In order to assess how far this assertion of 
marriage is likely to succeed, we compare the legislative proposals in 
this part of the Green Paper with recent empirical work on mothers’ 
views on marriage and cohabitation and their reasons for choosing 
one or the other.  Is there further evidence of the ‘rationality mistake’ 
where the government has misunderstood the ways in which people 
make decisions about partnering?  Has the role of family law 
consequently been misconstrued? We conclude that supportive and 
flexible legislation is needed, more on the model of recent legislation 
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in other European countries which recognises the varying ways in 
which people take moral economic decisions.
Strengthening Marriage and Parenting under New Labour
Chapter 4 of the Green Paper, itself entitled ‘Strengthening 
Marriage’, maps out a basic response to family change.  On one level, 
it claims that intervention aims to help the parenting relationship - 
whether married or not - to succeed. In any case, government 
competence is limited where ’families do not want to be lectured 
about their behaviour or what kind of relationship they are in’ (para 
4.2).  Yet at another level, the Green Paper states that the 
government’s preferred parenting structure is marriage.  As the 
preamble makes clear:
’marriage does provide a strong foundation for stability for the 
care of children.  It also sets out rights and responsibilities for 
all concerned.  It remains the choice of the majority of people in 
Britain.  For all these reasons, it makes sense for the 
Government to do what it can to strengthen marriage.’ (para 
4.8)
What is more, the vast bulk of the chapter is concerned with how 
marriage can be supported and encouraged.   Other possible 
partnership and parenting forms are hardly mentioned and nothing at 
all is said about same-sex parenting.  Yet in 1997 in Great Britain, 22 
per cent of children were born to cohabiting parents, with another 15 
per cent born to lone mothers (Social Trends 29, 1999: 50).  Both 
figures are increasing and cohabitation is predicted to double by 2021 
(Population Trends, Spring 1999: 13).  Nonetheless only about half a 
dozen of the 49 paragraphs of the Green Paper could have much 
relevance to such parents, and only three consider cohabitants 
directly.  The tenor of the advice in the Green Paper to all these 
parents seems to be ’get married’.  Whilst there is government 
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awareness of the phenomenal scale of marriage breakdown in the 
United Kingdom (para 4.9), this is not, however, seen as undermining 
the essential benefits of the institution itself:
‘Divorce statistics take the headlines, but marriage still works 
for the majority.  It provides millions of people with a strong and 
stable basis for bringing up children in a rapidly changing 
world.’ (para 4.6)
Although there is some acknowledgment that there are ‘strong and 
mutually supportive families and relationships outside marriage’ and 
that ‘many unmarried couples remain together ...and raise their 
children every bit as successfully as married parents.’ (para 4.7), this 
provides no reason, it seems, to strive to strengthen those 
relationships. All observations and proposals seem almost entirely 
premised upon the essential superiority of the married family form, 
which merely requires strengthening before it is able to flourish 
again.
To this end, a number of measures are put forward in chapter 4 of the 
Green Paper to strengthen marriage. These propose better 
preparation for marriage, including a clear statement of rights and 
responsibilities, pre-nuptial agreements about the distribution of 
money and property, an enhanced role for marriage registrars in 
providing premarital counselling, a longer period of notice to be given 
personally by both parties intending to marry, modernisation and 
personalisation of the civil marriage service, access to mediation and 
counselling to support marriages in difficulty, and better information 
meetings before divorce so as ‘to increase the chance of saving more 
marriages’ (para 4.12).  Clearer rules on property division on marital 
breakdown are proposed to reduce conflict between married couples. 
4
In contrast proposals affecting cohabiting families are limited to just 
two suggestions.  First, the introduction of a non-religious and public 
child-naming ceremony which may also be used to stage the public 
signing of a parental responsibility sharing agreement where parents 
are unmarried (para 4.39).  This is designed to encourage public 
assertion of both parents’ commitment to a child, whether or not they 
are living together. Second, the Green Paper rather grudgingly 
suggests that ‘it might therefore be worthwhile’ to produce a guide 
for cohabitants setting out their legal rights in relation to income, 
property, tax, welfare benefits, and responsibility towards their 
children, to be made available in Citizens Advice Bureaux and 
libraries (para 4.15).  These proposals would do nothing at all to 
address the complexity and inadequacies of the law relating to 
cohabitation.  Nor do they even show awareness of the ongoing work 
of the Law Commission and their long-awaited consultation paper on 
‘homesharing’ (see Harpum, 1995).  Similarly, while enforceable 
prenuptial contracts for those intending to marry are proposed, the 
Green Paper is silent on the issue of whether legally enforceable 
cohabitation agreements should similarly be able to govern property 
disputes within cohabitation relationships. Counselling to save 
cohabitation relationships is not considered at all, in sharp contrast to 
the proposed efforts to be invested in marriage-saving.  Yet, from the 
perspective of a child, surely it is the improvement of the parents’ 
relationship -irrespective of their marital status - which is of critical 
importance.  The Green Paper therefore fails to acknowledge yet 
alone address, the need for better family law-based regulation of 
cohabitation relationships.
It is little wonder then that Bea Campbell (1998) has dubbed the 
Green Paper ‘The Government’s Make’em Marry Crusade’.  Only if 
cohabitants or lone parents marry will they be rewarded with the 
5
legal protection and government support they and their children 
need.  As the Green Paper rightly observes, marriage, (through the 
matrimonial laws which govern this state-endorsed relationship), ‘sets 
out rights and responsibilities for all concerned’ (para 4.8).  As a 
consequence, it justifies the promotion of marriage and, effectively, 
the undermining of unmarried parenting. Yet, if the government so 
chose, it could endow cohabitation with similar ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ as those held by married partners.  This would 
provide legal security and state support for both partners and 
children within unmarried relationships.  It would also address the 
issue where, as we shall see below, many cohabitants - falsely - 
already believe they possess this.  
Why has the government chosen their particular course of action, in 
strengthening marriage in opposition to other partnership forms?  In 
Part I of the paper we discussed this in terms of the centrality of 
families - and parenting behaviour in particular - to New Labour’s 
version of communitarianism in restoring the beneficial links between 
social morality, social cohesion and economic success (see Figure 1, 
Part I, Barlow and Duncan, date).  In this Part to the paper, we focus 
on the family discourses that lie behind this appropriation of marriage 
as the ideal, preferred form.
Figure 1 around here
Figure 1 presents a number of alternative discourses about different 
family forms, focussing on cohabiting and lone mothers. What we see 
when we look at ‘the family’ depends as much on the particular 
configuration of the discourse that guides our gaze, and shapes our 
reports, as it does on the concrete object and facts of our scrutiny. 
Not least, those discourses influencing government vision channel 
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policy development and its legal implementation.  In this way family 
law can even be seen as the operationalisation of a particular 
discourse.  In Britain the socio-political debates about parenting have 
become polarised between two major views.  In one discourse, lone 
and cohabiting mothers are seen as a threat to society, both morally 
and financially; they are formative members of an underclass that has 
no interest in providing for themselves in legitimate ways.  In the 
other discourse, lone and cohabiting mothers are seen as a social 
problem; they are not personally irresponsible and are trying to do 
the best they can for themselves and their children, but their position 
puts them into a disadvantaged position.  The net result is to weaken 
both partnering and parenting.  However, in addition to these 'social 
threat' and 'social problem' discourses there are two other main 
identifiable discourses on cohabiting and lone mothers.  These are 
firstly a view of lone parenting and cohabitation as one of a number of 
diverse choices in a general social move towards 'lifestyle change' in 
family life.  And secondly, a view of lone parenting and cohabitation as 
an 'escape from patriarchy', where women seek to live their lives 
without control by men.  These four discourses can be characterised 
as in competition with each other in defining the meaning and causes 
of - and responses to - family change ( see Duncan and Edwards, 
1999). However, while there are strong distinctions between the 
discourses, they are not completely separate but can overlap and 
combine in particular aspects of their construction, as depicted in 
Figure 1.  Thus two very different discourses, those of 'social threat' 
and 'escaping patriarchy', are in some ways rather similar, appearing 
as opposite sides of the same coin. 
In terms of Figure 1 the Green Paper appears to combine the ‘social 
problem’ and ‘social threat’ discourses.  Partnering and parenting are 
a social problem in that state intervention is necessary to allow 
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families to perform these social and moral functions.  But at the same 
time alternative family forms, like cohabitation and lone motherhood, 
are seen as a threat to the successful fulfilment of these functions. 
This view, they claim, is justified by the assertion made by Jack Straw, 
as Home Secretary and Minister responsible for the Green Paper, that 
‘research’ shows that ‘there is a higher level of commitment between 
married couples than between those who cohabit; and married 
couples are more likely to stay together’ (Straw, 1998).  Some clue to 
the identity of the research referred to is found in the Longitudinal 
Survey linking birth registration status with family status according to 
the 1991 Census.  This tends to show that children under the age of 
10 born within marriage are more likely to be living with their natural 
parents than those born outside marriage, even if the birth was 
registered jointly (Social Trends 29, 1999: 51).  Yet this does not of 
course compare like with like.  If the cohabitants had been married, 
their break-up rate might have been just the same.  In other words, it 
may not be being married or cohabiting which makes the difference to 
relationship breakdown – a classic case of mixing correlation with 
cause.  Nonetheless, it is concluded marriage should therefore be 
strengthened and these other alternative forms discouraged.  
 Legal Responses to Family Restructuring: Britain in 
Comparative Perspective
We can briefly note here how proposals in the Green Paper are in 
some contrast to an increasing number of other developed countries. 
In Scandinavia, for instance, cohabitation and marriage have long 
held equality before the law, and same sex cohabitation, and more 
recently same sex marriage, have been drawn into the same orbit. 
Lone mothers are just another type of ‘worker citizen’ where all 
adults below pensionable age are treated as autonomous, and 
supported in taking up paid work (Duncan and Edwards, 1999, 
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Björnberg, 1992, 1997).  This represents the implementation of the 
‘lifestyle change’ discourse in terms of Figure 1, and its great 
advantage is that a large proportion of parents (up to 50 per cent) are 
not legally and politically marginalised.  Other longstanding examples 
of partial reform in the direction of the ‘lifestyle change’ approach, 
recognising the changing social realities of family life, can be drawn 
from some Commonwealth jurisdictions.  In the Canadian Province of 
Newfoundland, heterosexual cohabitants are permitted under the 
Matrimonial Property Act 1979 to opt into the matrimonial property 
legislation and once they do, are treated as if they were spouses.  In 
New South Wales, Australia, the De Facto Relationships Act 1984 
enables heterosexual cohabitants of at least 2 years to apply for 
maintenance and property adjustment on relationship breakdown. 
More recently, the Domestic Relationships Act 1994 in the Australian 
Capital Territory extends financial provision on relationship 
breakdown to all ‘personal relationships (other than legal marriage) 
in which one provides personal or financial commitment and support 
of a domestic nature for the material benefit of the other’ (s3(1)). 
Interestingly, in the European context, following the recent examples 
of the Netherlands, Belgium and two autonomous regions in Spain 
(Catalonia and Aragon), the Jospin government in France is currently 
attempting to more closely approximate the legal rights of cohabiting 
couples with those of married couples (see Barlow and Probert, 
1999).  This would represent a transition from the social threat / 
problem discourse to the lifestyle change discourse in terms of Figure 
1, and as such has attracted considerable opposition from the right 
and religious organisations (Henley, 1998, and Fabre, 1998). This 
change is to be achieved in two ways.  Firstly by adopting a definition 
of cohabitation which encompasses both heterosexual and same-sex 
cohabitation into the French Civil Code, cohabitants will be given a 
formal legal status combined with a ‘safety-net’ package of rights. 
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Secondly, by introducing ‘PACS’ (Pacte Civile de Solidarité) - civil 
union or civil solidarity contracts – again available to all unmarried 
cohabitants whether heterosexual or same-sex, the French legislation 
will give couples who have entered into a pacte the freedom to make 
their own binding legal arrangements.  At the same time it will also 
guarantee legal rights similar to marriage (and superior to the rights 
of ‘non-pacsé’ couples) for purposes including social security benefits, 
health insurance, inheritance and property division on relationship 
breakdown.  Interestingly, a duty, similar to that required in marriage, 
to offer each other ‘mutual and material assistance’ is also imposed 
on these couples.  The French state is thereby demanding some 
return on its investment in a legal status for cohabitants.  It does not, 
however, view it as an exclusively selfish and uncommitted family 
form giving rise to individualistic behaviour - a commonly perceived, if 
unsubstantiated ‘social threat’ feature of cohabitation (Lewis, 
1999:53-55). The proposed legislation, which receives its final reading 
on 12 October 1999, is thus clearly addressing the legal and policy 
implications of widespread cohabitation.
By way of contrast, the British government’s Green Paper proposals 
focus almost entirely on strengthening marriage, and demonstrate a 
wilful blindness to the social significance and reality of family 
restructuring away from marriage, ignoring the consequent need for 
legal reform.  This approach is fuelled by the belief that increased 
legal recognition of alternative family structures will accelerate the 
drift away from marriage.  As Jane Lewis has observed: 
“The fear is that family law has not done enough to defend 
marriage.  Thus Baroness Young also argued for the retention of 
fault in the law of divorce during the debates on the Family Law 
Act 1996 because of her belief that ‘law influences behaviour 
and sends out a very clear message’.
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There is considerable debate among social scientists on whether 
law has a direct effect on behaviour.  There is more agreement 
on the idea that it facilitates and additionally legitimates 
particular kinds of behaviour.” (Lewis, 1999, p3).
Despite, or perhaps in ignorance of this debate, the government 
appears to believe that changing financial and legal parameters, as in 
the Green Paper, will thereby alter the calculus for people’s decision 
making about partnering and parenting, and therefore in turn lead to 
the desired changes in behaviour.  They seem to share the view of 
Baroness Young that ‘law influences behaviour and it sends out a very 
clear message.  There would be no point in legislating at all if law did 
not influence behaviour’ (Hansard HL. 29.2.96 c. 1638). More lone 
parents will take up paid work, more couples will marry, less will 
cohabit and fewer will divorce. The means of carrying through this 
discourse, of strengthening marriage and reducing the importance of 
other family forms - or at least the threat they pose – can be seen then 
in terms of rational economic man and his close cousin the ‘rational 
legal subject’.  As Maclean and Eekelaar (1997, 7) have stated, ‘Law 
is a purposive activity and policy makers expect results’.  The problem 
is that the basic assumption about how people do make decisions 
about their moral economies - about how partnerships should be 
formed, sustained and dissolved; how parenting should be carried out; 
how this might be combined with paid work; and who does what sort 
of paid and unpaid work - might be incorrect.  The whole enterprise 
might then become irrelevant because of this ‘rationality mistake’.
Moral Rationality, Decision-Making and the Law
Much of the empirical research on the effects of family law on social 
behaviour has been undertaken in the context of divorce and family 
breakdown.  Lewis (1999 p33) in her useful review of this work points 
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out that whereas Robert Mnookin (1979) concludes that divorcing 
couples bargain ‘in the shadow of the law’, Jacob (1992) demonstrates 
that the influence of social networks was much more important than 
that of lawyers.  Similarly, Baker and Emry’s (1993) research among 
applicants for marriage licences and law students showed 
surprisingly large-scale ignorance of the law even among these 
groups.
Thus the way in which people make decisions about their moral 
economies in general, and their family structure in particular, is 
critical to the issue of whether marriage can be strengthened by 
continuing to focus legal privilege on this family form alone.  What 
role if any does their knowledge of the law play in shaping these 
decisions?  If no or false account is taken of the legal status conferred 
by marriage as opposed to cohabitation, then arguably the basis of 
government policy in this area is seriously flawed.  Such a situation 
would be made worse if piecemeal changes in the law equating 
cohabitation with marriage in particular contexts are actually fuelling 
such false perceptions, with legislative policy disarming rather than 
forewarning cohabitants of their ‘legal vulnerability’.
In order to assess these issues we draw on our second empirical study 
which focuses on beliefs about cohabitation compared to marriage. 
Thirty mothers2 with pre-school children were interviewed (eleven 
married, eleven cohabiting and eight lone mothers) in the contrasting 
social and labour market areas of Great Yarmouth in Norfolk and 
Merthyr Tydfil in South Wales.  The interviews explored reasons for 
cohabiting or marrying, and also aimed to discover respondents 
knowledge about relevant family law and how influential this was in 
terms of their partnering decisions.  This study is therefore 
particularly pertinent to chapter 4 of the Green Paper.
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Almost two -thirds of the interviewees saw marriage as an ideal family 
form, in that it symbolised stability and commitment .  Interestingly, 
this included the majority of cohabitants as well as half the lone 
mothers.   This ideal view parallels, therefore, the view of marriage 
taken in the Green Paper.   However, and crucially, respondents took a 
different view of the moral reality of their own situations.  Thus all the 
cohabitants had considered marriage, and all indicated that most 
people assumed they were married and that no stigma was attached 
to cohabiting.  But they had rejected marriage largely because they 
thought it made no difference to the success of their relationships 
and/or they had previous bad experiences of marriage. (As we shall 
see, they inaccurately believed this rejection had no legal 
implications).  Indeed, around half of these respondents actively saw 
marriage as in some way threatening to their relationship, because it 
would change their partner’s behaviour for the worse.  (Lone mothers 
saw marriage more as a source of unhappiness and disappointment). 
A smaller group of cohabitants did want to marry, but saw 
cohabitation as a trial marriage.  While these mothers saw the cost of 
a ‘proper marriage’ as a disincentive, they did not doubt the validity 
of cohabitation as a partnering and parenting form.  Marriage was 
again more of an ideal rather than some superior family form in 
practice.   At the same time, few of the married mothers had actually 
got married because of its ideal characteristics, and around half had 
done so because of their wider social position in terms of religious 
beliefs or pressure from partners or parents.  Indeed, many 
respondents saw the ideal of marriage as just that, an ideal not 
obtainable in practice. For many mothers therefore, and particularly 
the cohabiting and lone mothers, there were clear resonances of the 
‘lifestyle change’ and ‘escaping patriarchy’ discourses about family 
forms where cohabitation is seen as equal to, or even superior to, 
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marriage.  These views are not acknowledged in New Labour’s ‘social 
threat’ -’social problem’ view of unmarried families (see Fig 1) as 
replicated in the Green Paper .  In this context the lone mothers in the 
sample commonly hated the Child Support Agency (CSA), linked to 
the misconception that acceptance of ‘CSA money’ would mean that 
they would be forced to allow fathers contact with their children. 
This had led two of the lone mothers to refuse co-operation with the 
CSA, despite a 40% reduction in their benefit levels.
The practical advantages of marriage given by respondents, whether 
married or not, are particularly illuminating.  These did not refer to 
the superiority of marriage for partnering and parenting as supposed 
in the Green Paper.  Rather, they referred to marriage as a social 
symbol.  This symbolism was to be achieved in two major ways - 
through a change of name and through a full-blown ‘white wedding’ in 
church.
The desire by cohabitants to have the same surname as their children 
and partner was cited as a major reason for marriage, and in fact this 
had been a major reason for marrying by those in the sample who had 
previously cohabited.  It was the birth of children which commonly 
predicated this move. Conversely, most cohabiting mothers saw 
having a different surnames to their partner and children as the 
greatest disadvantage of not marrying. (Two had formally changed 
their surname to their partner’s and another two families had all 
adopted double-barreled names). Female name-changing is of course 
not a legal requirement, but is rather a powerful tradition. 
Presumably, this is taken as a social signifier of a ‘proper family’; one 
which follows accepted gender norms about roles and responsibilities. 
This is the very same reason why name changing is actually rejected 
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by some professional married women and by those with ‘alternative’ 
feminist views.
It was also clear that the cohabiting mothers were not prepared to 
marry in a simple register office wedding.  If they were to marry, it 
was on condition that they had a full-blown white church wedding.  It 
was the wedding as a social display and not the institution or ideal of 
marriage as a partnership or parenting form which, it seemed, was 
endowed with significance in the context of their lives. This is 
dramatically underscored by the fact that eight of these mothers had 
actually refused their partner’s offer of marriage in a Register Office! 
Those cohabitants in the ‘trial marriage’ group fully accepted that this 
might mean that they never married.  These were the only unmarried 
respondents who indicated that financial incentives would have a 
decisive effect on their decision to marry - but only if this enabled 
them to obtain the highly desired ‘white wedding’ in church.
Marriage was often seen as an ideal state, but in terms of everyday 
moral adequacy few respondents saw marriage as a superior 
partnering or parenting form. It was the strength of the mothers’ 
relationship with their partner that was decisive, and this was 
unaffected by whether marriage had taken place or not.  Similarly, 
marriage was seen as largely irrelevant to the welfare of children. 
Respondents, unlike government spokepersons, did not easily confuse 
partnering and parenting forms (married, cohabiting etc) with those 
processes (love, support, communication etc) that lead to the success 
or failure of these relationships.  In this sense, the respondents took 
rather more sophisticated moral judgments than the government. 
Rather, the significance of marriage for respondents was more that of 
a social symbol.  The proposals in the Green Paper to modernise the 
civil marriage service seem unlikely to make inroads into those 
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seeking out the traditional rituals that a church wedding offers. 
Equally, few respondents saw marriage in financial terms or, if they 
did so, this was secondary to their socially derived beliefs about the 
signifying role of marriage.  Here again, as with lone mothers’ 
decisions about the compatibility of paid work with good mothering 
(see Part I, Barlow and Duncan, date), we can discern a gap between 
people’s actual moral behaviour and that assumed in the Green Paper. 
This essentially social signifying role of marriage was buttressed by 
the ‘common law marriage myth’.  Nearly all respondents firmly 
believed that the law treated cohabitants with children of the 
relationship in all respects as if they were married.  This allowed 
marriage to be dismissed as ‘only a piece of paper’.   Although the law 
has not recognised common law marriage since the Clandestine 
Marriages Act of 1753, both married and unmarried cohabiting 
couples volunteered this as an acknowledged legal status.  Yet this is 
far from being an accurate reflection of the legal position.  Thus 
nearly all the cohabiting mothers believed, inaccurately, they would 
be entitled to a pension or other allowances on the strength of their 
partner’s contributions.  Only one was aware of the different tax 
treatment of cohabitants, and again only one was aware that 
cohabitant dependent partners cannot make claims for maintenance 
or other provision equivalent to that of a spouse under the divorce 
legislation.  Nor was there any understanding that strict property law, 
rather than family law, applies to owner-occupying cohabitants on 
relationship breakdown.  Two respondents’ views vividly illustrate the 
firm belief in common law marriage rights:
“I think the law says that after you have lived with someone for 
so long, you become their common law wife or husband……I‘ve 
never looked into it but I just assumed that because we’ve been 
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together for so long that we would be the same as if we were 
married.” (Norfolk cohabitant mother in a relationship of over 
20 years standing.)
And from the Welsh sample a similar understanding was expressed:
 
“People who live together are classed as married couples. 
Aren’t they called common law marriages?  Yes, that’s right, 
once they are together in the same house, it doesn't make no 
difference.” (A Welsh married mother who had previously 
cohabited with her husband for 11 years).
Yet in reality, unmarried cohabitants who are not sole or joint legal 
owners may thereby have little claim on their family home even when 
separation occurs after many years (as in Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 
317).  On death, an application for financial provision may well have 
to be made to the court under the Inheritance (Provision for Family 
and Dependants) Act 1975 in the attempt to secure the home for the 
surviving partner.  Nor, when a cohabiting partner dies, does the 
survivor have an automatic right to inherit any of the estate on 
intestacy, although again a claim may now be made under the 
amended 1975 Act for financial provision, itself less generous than 
that permitted to spouses (see ss 1(1)(ba) and 1A, Barlow, 1997: 90-
99).  Only one cohabitant in the sample was aware of this.  None had 
taken steps to make their position more secure by making wills, 
entering into cohabitation agreements and all remained unaware of 
any need to do so.  In addition there was an almost total ignorance of 
the current law relating to the acquisition of parental responsibility by 
unmarried fathers.  All the cohabiting mothers, together with a lone 
mother who had jointly registered the birth with the father, also firmly 
believed that unmarried fathers gained the legal status of fatherhood 
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(parental responsibility) through jointly registering the birth.  The 
majority of married mothers similarly believed this was the legal 
position of unmarried fathers.  However, this again is a myth. 
Unmarried fathers can, currently, only acquire parental responsibility 
either by entering into a formal ‘parental responsibility agreement’ (in 
the prescribed form) with the mother, or by court order (s4 Children 
Act 1989).   None of the cohabiting mothers had heard of this - not 
surprising perhaps when this information is deliberately withheld 
from parents on the birth of a child. Without exception, they had no 
idea that their partner’s legal status was in any way inferior to that of 
a married father.  
As one mother indicated:
‘I have never heard of parental responsibility agreements…I 
assumed you both got the same rights.…It just seems to me 
really strange that you have to physically both go to register the 
birth and get your names put on the birth certificate, yet you’re 
not asked if you want to enter this parental responsibility 
agreement.” (Welsh previously married cohabiting mother)
All of them believed that, should they die, the father would 
automatically become the legal guardian of their children.  In fact, for 
this to happen it would be necessary for the mother to either have 
appointed the father as testamentary guardian or to have entered into 
a parental responsibility agreement with him (ss 4 and 5 Children Act 
1989). 
This belief in the equivalence of ‘common law marriage’ is no doubt 
sustained by developments in the law giving some increased rights to 
cohabitants (but under which marriage is still clearly privileged), and 
the fact that the state has it both ways in assessing entitlement to 
means-tested welfare benefits - then cohabiting couples are treated 
exactly as if they were married in that their means are aggregated. 
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For, if people’s everyday experiences with officialdom perpetuate the 
myth, formal marriage then becomes reinforced in their eyes as an 
unnecessary legal status – nothing more than a piece of paper.  The 
decision whether or not to marry is reduced to one of pure personal, 
moral choice (Giddens, 1992), completing the circle in the move away 
from ‘institutional’ to ‘companionate’ marriage.
This then raises the question of whether such false perceptions can 
and should be reversed.  Given the perhaps unwitting complicity of 
legislative policy in fanning such beliefs, might a better way forward 
not be to impose marriage-like rights and duties on cohabitants 
(Bailey-Harris, 1996)?  The research findings indicate some general 
support for such an approach.  Ninety per cent of all respondents 
thought that any unequal treatment of cohabitants in law was quite 
wrong. In this context, the Green Paper’s cursory suggestion that 
more information should be made available to cohabitants about their 
inferior legal position is woefully inadequate.  It is interesting that the 
only substantial change in the law around cohabitation is the 
proposal, summarised in the Green Paper  (paras 4.7-4.8), to give 
most jointly registering fathers automatic parental responsibility. 
Rather than any move towards a ‘lifestyle choice’ view of 
cohabitation, however, on the model of France or Scandinavia, this 
reform appears more as a reflection of the ‘social threat’ discourse 
about the breakdown of traditional gendered families.  The proposed 
change can help create such families de jure (see Smart, 1987).  This 
may be buttressed by the linked ‘social threat’ view that children in 
unmarried families must perforce have weak male role models (see 
Part I, Barlow and Duncan, date).
The ‘common law marriage myth’ is both pervasive and deeply held. 
In a wider sense the ignorance of the law it displays is quite rational. 
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This is because couples generally see their partnership  - and its 
strength or weakness - in terms of a relationship, not in terms of an 
institution.   Indeed, as we saw earlier, for most the institution of 
marriage is valued simply as a social signifier of their relationship in 
their social network.  Few mothers share the government’s apparent 
view that the institutional form of partnership governs its success, or 
tends to make people into better parents.  In this way chapter 4 of the 
Green Paper on ‘Strengthening Marriage’ perpetuates the ‘rationality 
mistake’ we identified in Part I of the paper for the New Deal for Lone 
Parents.  People do not decide upon their moral economies according 
to the model of rational economic man and the rational legal subject
Conclusion
The aim of New Labour’s version of communitarianism is to remould 
family structures and practices in a way that will better promote 
social cohesion. Yet chapter 4 of the Green Paper Supporting Families 
reveals the limitation of New Labour’s vision in this field.  As the 
Conservative government before them, they have fallen prey to the 
political unease that has accompanied the drift away from marriage 
into alternative family forms and have identified strengthening the 
institution of marriage - at the expense of supporting family 
relationships more generally - as a main plank of their family and 
parenting policy. One of the key tools it will use to implement such a 
strategy is the law.  Whilst promoting marriage through fiscal policy 
may have been abandoned in the last budget, the privileged legal 
status of marriage - the government’s preferred parenting structure - 
will, in contrast to many of our European neighbours, very much 
remain.  By continuing to view alternative family forms as part of the 
‘social threat’ and ‘social problem’ discourses, any real quest for 
social cohesion has surely been abandoned.
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The empirical studies drawn on in the two parts of this paper 
demonstrate how the Green Paper proposals on the New Deal for 
Lone Parents, and on ‘Strengthening Marriage’, are undermined by 
what we have called ‘the rationality mistake’.  In implicitly assuming a 
universal model of ’rational economic man’ and the ‘rational legal 
subject’, the Green Paper fundamentally misunderstands how people 
actually do make important decisions about their moral economies. 
As the research shows, people seem to take such decisions with 
reference to moral and socially negotiated views about what 
behaviour is accepted or expected as right and proper and this 
negotiation, and the views that result, varies in particular social 
contexts.  Thus people make decisions in a different and arguably 
more sophisticated way, giving different results to those anticipated 
by the purposive policy makers using conventional economic and legal 
models.
As we have already noted, if people do not act according to the model 
of rational economic man and the rational legal subject, then 
legislation based on these assumptions might well be ineffectual. 
This is what seems to have happened with the pilot New Deal for Lone 
Parents, and the proposals to strengthen marriage seem to be taking 
a similar course.  Given the high rates of cohabitation in Britain, and 
the widespread evaluation that this is equivalent to marriage in most 
practical and emotional terms, then basing a policy of supporting 
families almost entirely upon marriage as an institution seems to 
leave the government with its head rather deep in the sand.
As Carol Smart (1997 :303) has argued, at the level of political 
rhetoric, ‘the family has been constructed as the one site where 
change should not occur and where change is seen as positively 
undesirable unless it is in a backward direction’. Yet, the Child 
21
Support Act experience well shows how ineffectual it can be to 
attempt to reassert traditional family morality through imposed, not to 
say punitive, legislation (see Part I, Barlow and Duncan, date).  In the 
same vein, Part II of the Family Law Act 1996 (which was to be 
implemented in the year 2000) was to revolutionise and extend the 
waiting time within the divorce process whilst purporting to better 
support the institution of marriage (see e.g. s1).  This Act had been 
widely predicted to encounter both procedural difficulties and social 
resentment (see e.g. Cretney, 1996, Davis, 1995).  Carol Smart and 
Bren Neale (1999:175) suggest that this is due to family law 
legislation in the 1990s being imposed ‘from the top down’ rather 
than enacted in response to social pressure - ‘from the bottom up’. 
This is in contrast to the liberal family law reforms of the 1970s and 
1980s which have achieved a high level of acceptance.  Interestingly, 
the implementation of the remainder of the Family Law Act 1996 has 
now been postponed indefinitely.  This decision follows ‘disappointing’ 
results from pilot testing of the new law, which showed how 
unpopular both pre-divorce information meetings and new-style 
mediated divorce over a long period of time were likely to be (see 
Lord Chancellor’s Department, Press release No. 159/99).  At least 
here, the ‘rationality mistake’ may have been recognised, albeit 
prompted by fears of unpopularity at the next general election (see 
Dyer, 1999).
New Labour’s communitarianism, unlike its rhetoric, does not involve 
a ‘from the bottom up’ approach in its project for social cohesion. 
Rather it is prescriptive and uniform in tone and, ironically in view of 
the tenets of communitarianism, rides roughshod over what different 
social groups and communities believe is right and proper.  The New 
Labour government believes that law facilitates and, additionally, 
legitimates particular kinds of behaviour and thus will use it, 
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coercively if need be, to achieve its ‘moral reform crusade’ (Coward, 
1998).  Yet this is to completely misunderstand the power of law in 
people’s decision-making processes in the moral economic sphere. 
Thus the Green Paper proposals, rather than supporting families and 
promoting social cohesion, may simply perpetuate the ‘rationality 
mistake’ already seen in other recent family law legislation and risk 
excluding an increasingly large section of society. The alternative is to 
try to develop supportive and flexible legislative frameworks which do 
recognise the varying ways in which people take moral economic 
decisions.  This is now the real challenge for the ‘joined-up thinking’ 
the government extols.  
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